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In the late 1970s and early 1980s more and more feminist theorists came to the
conclusion that the attempted and partially realized "alliance" between "Marxism" and
"feminism" had ended in an "unhappy marriage" marked by significant theoretical
inadequacies of various Marxist currents for feminist theorizations (Sargent; Benhabib,
Uneasy Alliance 137; Nicholson, Feminism 56). Slowly taking shape in the mid-1980s
and developing into full-scale debates and projects by the turn of the decade, a "new
alliance" became an issue for a growing number of feminist theorists. The supposedly
"natural ally" (Nicholson, Introduction 5) was located in "postmodernism"--along with
"feminism" among the most significant political and cultural currents on the Western
intellectual and academic landscapes throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Issues and
implications of the "postmodern turn," for example, the critique of the traditions of
Western philosophy stemming from Enlightenment ideals, in particular of the latter' s
male-centered universal and unified subject, seemed to shed new light on crucial goals
and problems, still unsettled today, of feminist theorizations. Placed at the center of the
contemporary fragmentation ofthe feminist movement, the identity category "woman"--
the subject and object offeminist theorizations and practices--is heavily fragmented itself:
contested in an activating of difference by their assumed constituencies ranging from
"women of color" to biraciallesbian separatists (Herrmann and Stewart 1-2).
The controversies over what is, among others, portrayed as either "alliance" or
"misalliance" (Benhabib, Uneasy Alliance 137) between "feminism" and
"postmodernism" has led to a multitude of responses and positions, from embracing at
least some of the "alliance's" putative promises to rejecting any form of engagement
between the two as the "destruction" of "feminism" per se (Di Stefano, Dilemmas 77).
The,ongoing debate is still--and given the proclaimed openness ofthe theoretical currents
in question, it might be said has to remain--open, leaving any theorization of a
"postmodern feminism" with an "uncertain valence" (Wicke and Ferguson 3). Among the
2purported "postmodernists," whose work was widely discussed by feminist theorists and
thus fueled the'exchanges in question especially in the 1980s, was the French pbilosopher
Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard.
Th~ purpose of tbis paper is to focus on the intersections and conflicts between
"feminism" and "postmodernism." To phrase it more precisely, two crucial aspects in the
approaches of Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard, i. e. first, bis handling of "pbilosophy" and its
implications for social criticism and second, bis conceptualization of the social and the
subject with its implications for the core category of feminist theorizations, "woman,"
will be presented and discussed in the light of the project of a "postmodernist feminism"
as advanced by the American feminist theorists Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson. It
will be shown that an "alliance" in the sense of a "lock-step symmetry" following
predicaments of linkage is not--and cannot be--at stake in an "encounter" between
Lyotardian "postmodern" thought and "feminism." Rethought to the ends of feminist
projects, the former, however, is capable and does inform feminist tbinking as shown in
and beyond the Nicholsonian and Fraserian perspective. Nevertheless, crucial elements
and implications of the Lyotardian version of"postmodernism" have to be rejected, wbile
others, for example, the conception of the "differend," once they are rethought and
substantiated, fruitfully inform feminist approaches to deal with the fragmented subject of
their ,discourses and to conceptualize theoretical as well as political projects.
To do so, the paper will give abrief account of the two issues concemed in
Lyotard's work, focusing mainlyon his Postmodern Condition. AReport on Knowledge,
and then outline the theorizations ofNicholson and Fraser which deal with tbis matter. In
the following section, Lyotard's thinking as weIl as Nicholson and Fraser's approaches
will be discussed, showing strengths and wealrnesses of the French philosopher' s
perspective for feminist thinking and of the Fraserian and Nicholsonian "postmodernist
feminism." In addition, attempts will be made to indicate ways in which perceived
impasses and flaws can be rethought.
3Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard's philosophical thinking is predominantly infornled by the
"linguistic turn" ofWestern philosophy (Lyotard, Differend xiii). In his earlier work The
Postmodern Condition. AReport on Knowledge, he draws significantly on Ludwig
Wittgenstein's later studies as weIl as on the work of Anglo-American philosophers such
as J. L. Austin and J. R. Searle. With the publication of this "report," which became
widely known and discussed on the American academic landscape, Lyotard triggered the
controversy over "postmodernism" in the academic discipline of philosophy (Welsch
116). The philosophy oflanguage, especially a particular focus on the "pragmatic aspect"
of the "facts of language" (Postmodern Condition 9), is seen as the key to an adequate
analysis of society (Rüb 87).
In his "report," Lyotard constructs his argument and analysis around the hypothesis
that the "metanarratives"--or grand recits--of modernity have collapsed and thus lost
their credibility. Three "metanarratives" are or more precisely used to be dominant: the
emancipation of humanity, i. e. of the rational subject (narrative of Enlightenment), the
hermeneutics ofmeaning (narrative ofHistoricism), and the dialectics of Spirit (narrative
of Idealism) (Postmodern Condition xxiii). Following Lyotard, the "modern" sciences
legitimate--and have to legitimate--the rules of their language games by referring to
"metanarratives" as "discourses of legitimation" in order to distinguish themselves from
mere fables. In tbis respect, "Truth" and "Justice," for example, far from being universal
values, appear as grounded in "metanarratives" of pbilosophy. The collapse of tlle
"metanarratives" of legitimation does not only have a far-reaching impact on the
sciences, but is also linked to the crisis of metaphysical philosophy (xxiv). Not being able
to serve as an apparatus of legitimation anymore, philosophy is, nevertheless, not
condemned to disappear, but--in a rather limited approach--to focus on areas like the
"history ofideas" and "systems ofknowledge" (41).
An approach such as this also sheds new light on the problematic of thinking
through the relationsbip between men and women. Following Lyotard, (traditional)
Western philosophy offers the "direction for an answer" (Women's Struggles 14) to the
problematic concerned. The very question, however, is and can only be phrased in its
male-centered "metalanguage"--or one of its "metanarratives." Thus the possibility and
impossibility of an answer is marked by a pre-constituted binary opposition between
"man" and "woman," predetermining it and foreclosing others. The philosopher turns out
to be "a secret accomplice ofthe phaIlocrat." The claim to speak the "Truth" is based on
4a discourse of knowledge grounded in a "decision" that cannot be proven, but is rather
"a fact of power." Therefore men themselves have to be regarded as "a minority in a
patchwork where it becomes impossible to establish ... any major order" (15-6). As a
consequence of this line of reasoning, the "destruction" of--or further destruction ot:
since their collapse has already been stated--"metanarratives" (of philosophy) is "one of
the things at stake in women's struggles" (14, 9). According to Lyotard, it is not an
affirmation of a "feminine principle" set against a "male" one which needs to be at the
core of the political and theoretical efforts of the women's movement, but a move
beyond a safeguarding of the "difference between sexes," because the "feminine
principle" only helps to secure the dominance of the "masculine" one by functioning as
its "outside" (11-2).
In a most basic and simplified way, Lyotard defines the "postmodern" as an
"incredulity toward metanarratives." Dealing mostly with the problem area of
knowledge, he refers to its condition in nl0st highly developed contemporary societies as
"postmodern" (Postmodern Condition xxiii), perceiving this condition not as a
nlonolithic and unchangeable "state," but as a movement. Something in the
representation and use of knowledge is "shifting" and has not yet stopped (Which Resists
414). Due to the collapse of the "metanarratives" of legitimation, contemporary science
is not only incapable of legitimating itsel( but also of legitimating--and subduing--the
wide range of other language games as it used to. Thus it is refined to "play[] its own
game" (Postmodern Condition 40). Following Lyotard, there is a multitude of language
games which are both heteromorphous and incommensurable. ,,[S]ubject[ed] to
heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules," language games cannot be subsumed under a
consensus, which is incapable of including the "totality of metaprescriptives" in the first
place, without the exercise of some form of "terror" (65-6; Answering 81). Developing
and setting up this position against Jürgen Habernlas' theorization of a "universal
consensus" achieved by the means of Diskurs, Lyotard considers the striving for an
overarching consensus as linked to the collapse of the "metanarratives" of modernity and
thus defunct. The price to pay for an "illusion" such as this is too high to sustain the
means in question.
The Lyotardian "postmodern" model of legitimation, by contrast, revolves around
the concept of plural, local, and immanent petits recits, i. e. little narratives in a given
culture which are legitimated "by the simple fact that they do what they do." The model
5advances the conceptualization of "paralogy" to legitimize "postmodern" science in its
production of "the unknown" (Postmodern Condition 60, 23). Rejecting any notion of a
meta-model, "paralogy" stresses the search for dissents and testifies to differences (66).
The concept which evokes an understanding of "faulty or deliberately contradictory
reasoning" is part of Lyotard's approach to transform the ·structure of "reason" itself
(Connor 34). As a core principle of "postmodern" knowledge, it heightens thereby the
capability to "tolerate the incommensurable" (Lyotard, Postmodern Condition xxv). At
stake in the Lyotardian quest for "paralogy" is the recognition of the heterogeneity of
language games. Any consensus--contradicting Habermasian thinking--on the rules of a
language game has to be understood as "local" and a mere "stage" in a dialogue, but not
as its end (66) which is captured by the conceptualization of"paralogy."
"Paralogy" as a model of legitimation opposes the criterion of performance
improvement. Operating as "a kind of legitimation" for the technicallanguage game, the
latter gains more and more dominance in science--and beyond--today (46-7; Answering
76-7; "Post-" 103). "Truth" and "Justice" have stopped to serve as its criteria and are
replaced by performativity and efficiency, the guiding principles to maximize the output
while minimizing the input (Postmodern Condition 44). The goal inherent in this
development is "power" which assurnes a self-Iegitimating status by legitimating science
and the Iaw on the grounds of the Iatter' s efficiency and this very efficiency on the basis
of the Iaw and science (46-7). As a consequence, the status of science towards
technology is shifting in a way that dominance is given to the latter. Furthermore, the
condition of knowledge has been profoundly changed (4), it no longer bears any
adherence to notions of"Truth" or to those ofimmanence and locality. Beyond the realm
of science, the criteria of efficiency and performativity are "forced" on other language
games, transforming "Ianguage" itself into a "productive commodity" and the means of
"terror" are used (46; Lyotard, Svelte Appendix 27-8).
Concerning Lyotard's thinking, it seems to be important to heighten our awareness
of his conceptualization of the term "postmodernism" which he hirnself used in the book
focused on above and with which he has been credited ever since. In a lecture given
years later, Lyotard pointed out that he had merely made use of the term in a
"provocative way to put the struggle in the foreground of the field of knowledge" (Re-
6Writing 8). In attempts to clarify what he then refers to as an "honorable postmodernity"
(Differend xiii), Lyotard stresses that his conceptualization neither appeals to a notion of
a linear temporal sequence according to which "postmodernity" follows "modernity,"
treating the two as "clear-cut historical entities" (Re-Writing 3) nor to a mode of an
"anything goes" eclecticism of the kind he perceives the architect Charles Jencks
advancing (Answering 76). For Lyotard, "post-modernity"--not clearly distinguishing the
term from "postmodernism"--is marked by "a whole range, a whole series of hypotheses
. . ., many possible readings of the contemporary world," implying "resistance." (Which
Resists 414) It is a "re-writing ofmodernity," carrying with it the sense of "resistance,"
which is considered to have always been at stake in modernity (Re-Writing 8). Put in
other words, "post-modernity" is "a promise with which modernity is pregnant definitely
and endlessly" (4) to the extent that modernity "presupposes a compulsion to get out of
itself and to resolve itself:" striving for a "final equilibrium," for instance, in the form of a
"utopian order."
Lyotard's clarification ofhis use ofthe term "postmodernism" goes beyond a more
precise elaboration on the problem area in question by reversing some of its aspects. The
term "postmodern" is, for example, at least to a certain extent freed from the opposing
binary construction it formed with "modem," which bore much more than temporal
notions, by locating the former as part of the latter. Overall the (revised) Lyotardian
conceptualization resembles more Andreas Huyssen' s notion of a "postmodernism of
resistance," rejecting an "easy postmodernism of the 'anything goes' variety" and
abandoning the dichotomy of aesthetics and politics (Huyssen 52), than Andrew Ross'
call for an appropriation and redefinition of "postmodernism" in its "profusion of
meanings" dependent on particular contexts and purposes (Ross xi).
Lyotard's "philosophical" approaches touched upon above offer ways to social
analysis as weIl as the prospect of social criticism. In The Postmodern Condition, he
draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein' s conceptualization of language games as "bring[ing] into
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is apart of an activity, or of a form of
lif~" (Wittgenstein § 23). Since the Lyotardian critique of "metanarratives" entails a
significant move away from the metaphysics of the subject, in which the notion of
humanity as a collective and universal subject is rejected, a different approach to the
7questions of subjectivity and the social is necessary--and wanted (Postmodern Condition
66; Answering 73). The Lyotardian concept of an "agonistics of language," based on an
understanding of speaking as "fight[ing] in the sense of playing" of language games, is
paired with the conceptualization of "observable social bonds" as constituted by
language "moves" as part of language games (Postmodern Condition 10-1). Following
the crisis and collapse of "metanarratives," contemporary sociality is characterized by
dispersed "clouds of narrative language elements" and a multitude of language games
(xxiv).
The political project going along with social criticism entails a safeguarding of the
very heterogeneity and incommensurability of language games. Following Lyotard, "a
war" need to be wage[d] on totality" which is seen at work, for instance, in a universal
and unified subject and consensus (Answering 82). Applying bis conceptualization of
"paralogy" from the realm of science to the one of sociality, Lyotard puts an emphasis on
the need to "assurne responsibility for the mIes and effects" of language games and to
validate the mIes in question by the means of "paralogy," securing difference and
preventing the emergence and spread of "terror" (66). An approach such as this goes
beyond a traditional conceptualization of the political. Perceiving "politics" in itself as
"defeated," for instance, in a Marxist and non-Marxist sense of capturing the political
sphere of the State, the French pbilosopher advance a conceptualization of bearing
witness to and activating differences by "resistance"-bearing "writing" in its "strong and
broadest sense" (Which Resists 416; Answering 82).
In bis conceptualization of subjectivity, Lyotard grasps the "self' as something
wbich is "in each moment transitory" (Reijen 310). In an approach which makes use of
the terminology of system theory, the "self' is not referred to as "an island," but as
"exist[ing] in a fabric of relations" and thus more mobile and complex in nature than ever
before (Lyotard, Postmodern Condition 15). Both "man" and "woman" are situated at
,,'nodal points' of specific communication circuits." They are positioned by the effects of
language games as sender, addressee or referent in a multiplicity of ways and as such
never "entirely powerless." "Not woven with a single thread," the social bonds are
formed by at least two, in most of the cases even more, language games (40). Though
Lyotard does not claim that the social in its "entirety" is composed of language games,
they are seen as the "minimum relation" which is necessary for the former' s "exist[ence]"
8(15). Furthermore, the province of "a pragmatics of language particles" is portrayed as
the dominant realm concerning any approach to contemporary and future sociality (xxiv).
In The Differend. Phrases in Dispute, Lyotard tries to clarify and layout his
approach in a way that avoids some of the fallacies and problems posed in his earlier
work. To do so, he moves from the model of language games to the one of "phrases"
(xii-i). Basing his argument on the hypothesis that "there are phrases" (Which Resists
405) defended by the argument that they are--even in the phrasing of a doubt about their
existence--"imnlediately presupposed," Lyotard conceptualizes a "phrase" as constituted
in accordance with a set of mIes called its "regimen" (Differend xi-i). A "phrase" of a
specific "regimen" cannot be translated into another "phrase," if the latter is not of the
same "regimen" as the fOffiler. However, the two can--and have to be, since there is no
"non-phrase" and it simply must "happen"--linked onto one another according to a
"genre of discourse" which is to be established. This linking proves to be problematic and
to assurne the form of a conflict which cannot be avoided, since there is no "universal
genre of discourse," which could serve as a means to regulate it. The legitimacy of one
side of the two or more "phrases in dispute" does not entail the lack of legitimacy of the
other side (or sides). Lyotard conceptualizes the conflict concerned as a "differend" (xi).
An approach such as this enables the French philosopher to dispel any notion of
"intentionality" on tlle part of the subject, as is still the case with the "player" of a
language game. The latter is now situated in the universes presented by phrases 'before'
any intention (Lyotard 17). The "I" and "we" are "immersed in 'language'" and oriented
by "phrases" (Which Resists 408). In a phrase, the "I" is given a "proper name," which is
not to be understood as a "subjectivity." It is rather an identity "around which many
phrases come and go" (410). "Language," therefore, is not a "human creation" with a
"human being" endowed with it, but "man," the "we" as weIl as the "I" are a "creation of
language." (409; Differend, Referent 4). Following the consequences of his thinking,
Lyotard, rejects the very existence and notion of an "actor," replacing it with Ins concept
of an "actuality of phrases." Neither the social nor the subject position, however, is all
discursive, but tlley are marked by the universes of phrases which encompass a multitude
of discursive as weIl as non-discursive ones, for example, "phrases ofthe body" (411).
9Once working from a socialist-feminist perspective (Fraser, Practices 2; Nicholson,
Feminism 54), Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson are among the more prominent
American feminist philosophers and social theorist who joined the debates over
Lyotardian thought and "postmodernism" in the early and mid-1980s. In their
theorizations, Nicholson and Fraser attempt to take a first decisive step in an "encounter"
between "feminism" and "postmodernism," identifying the French philosopher with this
"current" based on his elaborations on what is perceived as "postmodernism's" cherished
positions, i. e. the "end of metanarratives," the question of legitimization, and finally, the
overall critique of any "meta"-dimension of concepts and discourses (Fraser and
Nicholson 242-4). What is seen to be at stake in staging this "encounter" is revealed by
their choice ofthe term "postmodernist feminism," which is not be equated with ,,[New]
French Feminisms," i. e. the writings of Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray, among others,
for which the term was originally used (Tong 217). Perceiving "nlany points of overlap"
between the two "currents" in question (Nicholson, Introduction 5), Fraser and
Nicholson's perspective of a "postmodernist feminism" aims at encompassing the
supposed strengths of "postmodernism" and "feminism" which are seen as supplementing
one another, while ridding itselfofthe two "currents'" respective weaknesses (Fraser and
Nicholson 243). "Postmodernism"--in a critically reread version--functions in a sense as
an "imperative" to develop new theoretical paradigms, following the "linguistic turn," in
order to arrive at aversion of "social criticism without philosophy" (Fraser, Wende 145;
Antithesis 170) which is intended to serve both the ends and means of a feminist project.
In its broadest sense, the latter, according to Fraser and Nicholson, can be seen as
leading to an accomplishing ofwomen's liberation and emancipation.
Nicholson and Fraser perceive Lyotard's thinking to a certain extent as fruitful for
their own theorization, since his approaches present a "deep and far-reaching criticism of
the institution of philosophy" entailing and leading to a project of social criticism which
rejects the underpinnings of traditional philosophy (Fraser and Nicholson 242-3). This
point of overlap between feminist and Lyotardian thinking sterns from the latter' s "anti-
foundationalist" perspective which is identified as having been placed at the core of his
hypothesis of the end of legitimating "metanarratives."
The two American feminist theorists, however, criticize Lyotard's approach for
still granting the term "philosophy" a "structural privilege" over social criticism and
political practice despite its devaluing of "philosophy" and its inherent claim to
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conceptualize a form of "social criticism without philosophy." "Philosophy" is used as
the starting point of the entire project guided by a rather unspecified "metapolitical
commitment ... to anti-totalitarianism" (249). Thus the approach is marked by "political
naivete," leading to an ignorance towards the needs of political practice and social
criticism (243-4). Furthermore and adding to this particular weakness, the Lyotardian
conceptualization of an alternative source of legitimation and its emphasis on "petit
recits" has to be seen as incoherent and inconsistent. Even in Lyotard's project there is a
necessity to develop a mode of social criticism which transcends the local, plural, and
immanent little narratives in order to counter the analyzed, increasing dominance of the
technical language game and its legitimating criteria of performativity and efficiency
which threaten to transform the condition ofknowledge as well as the social. To make a
claim such as this, Lyotard hirnself has to rely on a "normative judg~ent" and is thereby
contradicting his rejection ofthis very step (247). Finally, the Lyotardian farewell to the
legitimizing "metanarrative" and "foundationalist philosophy" takes, as is argued by
Nicllolson and Fraser, the entire project a step too far by excluding genres of social
criticism perceived as needed by "feminism"--most of all those capable of identifying
macrostructures of inequality like the subordination of women--and still not necessarily
grounded in "philosophy" (257, 247). The abandonment of "social theory" which is seen
as the most decisive weakness leads the two American feminist theorists further away
from Lyotardian thinking.
Interpreting the Lyotardian approach, in sum, as a "weak and inadequate
conception of social criticism without philosophy" (257), Fraser and Nicholson advance
their own theorizations, partially making use by the former' s thought, but shutting core
positions out. Committed to an "anti-foundationalism," they develop "robust" versions of
social criticism which do not rid themselves oftheir "social-critical force" (243). The two
feminist tlleorists' approach of a "social criticism without philosophy"--regarding
"philosophy" as an "ahistorical, transcendental discourse claiming to articulate the
criteria of validity for all other discourses" (Fraser, Antithesis 170)--takes the
"subordination of women to and by men" as its starting point and its social object to be
analyzed. As a result, the project is thought to be grounded in a critical political
perspective and thus opposing the Lyotardian privileging of philosophy. 'An approach
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such as Fraser and Nicholson's opens up various roads to the different genres of social
criticism foreclosed by Lyotardian "postmodernism" (249). The use of "large narratives
about changes in social organization and ideology" and "institutional analysis of cultural
production" as well as "normative theories of justice," for instance, does not only
become possible, but is regarded as indispensable for an adequate social analysis and
criticism of the complex and multi-Iayered phenomena of male dominance and female
subordination. The prospect of developing "emancipatory alternatives" entailing
"normative judgments" and following the feminist commitment to "liberatory politics" is
not abandoned and has not fallen prey to a theoretical and practical perspective of an
"anything goes" (Fraser, Antithesis 175).
Nicholson and Fraser' s theorizations retain the very notion and concept of
"criticism" and "critique," grasping the latter as both "situated and amenable to self-
reflection," radical as well as "subject to warrants" (175), and placing it in their overall
perspective of a "carefully constructed" "postmodern[ist] feminism" (Nicholson,
Introduction 9). "Criticism" therefore is in no need for "philosophy," since it assumes the
form of a "contextualizing historical narrative" which "genealogizes" norms and values,
situating them in a more exact way (Fraser, Antithesis 170). Conceptualized as
"pragmatic and fallibilistic," the Nicholsonian and Fraserian perspective seeks to remain
rooted in its criticism of "foundationalism." To move away from any "foundationalist"
grounding, the methods and theoretical as well as practical political approaches deployed
are culturally and historically specific, each of which is only developed for a particular
task, and thus avoid any universalistic appeal, replacing it by an emphasis on a
, comparativist perspective (Fraser and Nicholson 258). In this respect, the "smaller"
narratives and ratl1er "non-theoretical" approaches also counteract the distorting aspects
ofthe "larger" and "theoretical" ones--and vice versa--arriving at fruitful middle grounds
(Fraser, Antithesis 168).
The "anti-foundationalism" placed at the core the Nicholsonian and Fraserian
perspective of a "postmodemist feminism" is used as the main approach in an attempt to
abandon one of the supposed weaknesses of many feminisms and by doing so, to dismiss
the metaphysically grounded claim of a "single feminist theory or method," hindering
contemporary feminist theorizations (258). What is seen at work in older as well as more
recent feminist writings is a grounding in "quasi-metanarratives" (250), i. e. "very large
social theories," for instance, construed to analyze sexism based on premises of cross-
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culturally valid "natures" of human beings and social conditions, thus ignoring the
historical context of the latter and their cultural as well as regional specificity. The
persistence of these lines of "foundationalism" are, according to Fraser and Nicholson,
disabling for its unawareness of difference between women of different ethnicity/races,
classes, and sexual orientations, among others, therefore impeding "sisterhood" and
feminist alliances with "other progressive nlovements" due to its insistence on "an
essential definition" (243, 257, 259). The Fraserian and Nicholsonian fallibilistic and
pragmatic perspective, by contrast, takes difference as a decisive aspect into account
without merely celebrating it "for its own sake" and dismissing all lines of communality
anlong women. Thus, the forms of inquiry offered by "postmodernist feminism" seem to
speak to the problems and forms of feminist political practices in useful ways (Nicholson,
Introduction 10; Fraser and Nicholson 259).
Criticizing the Lyotardian approaches to "philosophy" and "foundationalism,"
Nicholson and"Fraser extend their criticism to the French philosopher's conceptualization
of sociality which is closely linked with his "anti-foundationalism." Embedded in
nontotalizable and heterogeneous notions, it proves to be incapable of deploying
categories of social analysis such as gender in a fruitful way and accounting sufficiently
on the subject of feminist theorizations, i. e. "woman" (Fraser and Nicholson 247).
Repudiating a stance that the category "woman" is unavoidably too reductive and thus
has to be given up, the two American feminist theorists elaborate on a conceptualization
which does reject "woman" as well as "feminine gender identity" as universal and unified
categories, but advances an approach which encompasses a plurality and complexity of
social identities. Not privileging gender, it rather locates the concept in its intersections
witll race/ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation, among others (258). As a non-
universalistic category, "woman" is still considered to be useful and necessary in order to
advance "generalizing claims about 'women'," which, according to the overall fallibilistic
and pragmatic theorizations, always have to be subject to revision (Fraser, Antithesis
174-5). What is seen to be at stake is not amere "deconstruction," but also a
"reconstruction" of "woman," offering a project of "utopian hope" (175). To do so, the
category has to be "genealogized," i. e., following Fraser and Nicholson, like the norms
deployed in the perspective "framed by a historical narrative and rendered temporally and
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culturally specific" (Nicholson, Feminism 66). To think "woman" as a cultural
construction, however, does not entail a sense ofpowerlessness on the part ofthe subject
referred to. In regard to its subjectivity, "woman," by contrast, is and has to be seen as
"endowed with critical capacities" (Fraser, Antithesis 175).
In essays published after outlining their "postmodem-feminist" project, both Fraser
and Nicholson consider approaches to theories of language as advanced by the later
Wittgenstein and American pragmatism as compatible with their readings of
"postmodernism" and useful for their feminist theorizations (63, 69; Fraser, Discourse
Theory 191). Among others and taking the approach touched upon above a step further,
a pragmatic theory of discourse is seen as offering ways to an adequate analysis of the
formation and shifting of social identities in their complexity and plurality (178).
Conceptualized as a "set of historically situated practices," "language" allows a linkage
between the study of discourse and society (Nicholson, Feminism 63-4). In maintaining
the category "woman," Fraser stresses that "no one is simply a woman" and "not always
... to the same degree" due to the subject's acting according to various "set[s] of
descriptions" in n1ulti-Iayered social contexts (Discourse Theory 178). By doing so, she
rejects a unified and universalistic notion of gender identity and "woman," thus opening
up a much broader field for feminist analysis and politics by rethinking social identities as
complex, changing and discursively constructed. Combined with larger narratives of
structural analysis of the political economy and institutions, the appropriation of a reread
version of a pragmatic language philosophy and discourse theory proves, following
Nicholson and Fraser, to be fruitful for the "postmodern feminism" at stake in their
project (Fraser, Wende 148-9).
Having outlined crucial aspects of the Fraserian and Nicholsonian project of a
"postmodernist feminism," which appropriates, but mostly rejects aspects of Lyotardian
thought, I would like to undertake a closer critical examination of the problem area in
question in order to grasp the prospects and flaws of their "perspective" as well as the
contributions and difficulties with Lyotardian thinking.
In their conceptual and theoretical efforts to take the first steps in an "encounter"
between "feminism" and "postmodernism," Fraser and Nicholson conflate approaches of
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Lyotard as presented in his work The Postmodern Condition with "postn10dernism" in its
entirety. To do so ignores the multiplicity of "currents" termed "postmodern," since
Lyotardian thinking does not represent all of "postmodernism" (Butler, Foundations
151). Forced under a single "paradigmatic designator," the very aspect of difference on
which the "currents" in question insist is occluded (Singer 464). Furthermore, the
attempts by the French philosopher to clarify--and partially modify--his position and
draw boundaries towards those postmodernisms forwarding a notion of an "anything
goes" are not sufficiently taken into account. Even if the ends and means of feminist
theorizations 11ave to be taken into account first and foremost in the project concerned,
rendering a--if at all possible--clear-cut distinction between "modern" and "postmodern"
less important (Nicholson, Introduction 16), a rereading of Lyotard such as this
forecloses other ways of making use of bis thinking. His conceptualization of
"resistance" in the attempt to "re-write" modernity, for instance, could be fruitfully
rethought for the perspective in question and in a more basic way, the form of the
"encounter" more critically thought through.
To shift the focus to the other "current" in the "encounter" in question,
"feminism," does not lessen the problems in grasping a term, its meaning as well as its
deployment. A rudimentary definition of "feminism" and "feminist," acceptable to Fraser
and Nicholson, nught be the one given by Rosalind Delmar which refers to a feminist as
"someone who holds that women suffer discrimination because of their sex, that they
have specific needs which remain negated and unsatisfied, and that the satisfaction of
these needs would require a tadical change . . . in the social, economic and political
order" (5). Beyond this, it proves to be extremely difficult--ifnot impossible--to con1e up
with any common definition which could be shared by feminists due to the pll:lrality and
fragmentation of contemporary "feminism" both in theory and practice. This does not
mean that a drive for a "single feminist method" or a "single feminism" should be at stake
again. To secure the multiplicity of feminisms is a crucial step in any feminist project
trying to avoid discrimination against men1bers of its own constituency. However, as far
as the Fraserian and Nicholsonian project is concerned, it remains necessary to
discriminate between what does and what does not belong to feminist approaches.
In staging an "encounter" between "feminism" and "postmodernism," the two
terms working as "textual designators" depend on some criteria of exclusion as weIl as
inclusion to be credible and useful (Singer 464). Since both of them also function as
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"forms or contexts for social production and exchange," leaving--as indicated above--the
two signifiers, their scope as weIl as apparatus open to revision (465), a theorization of a
"perspective" which seeks to conjoin the two "currents" becomes a questionable
endeavor. In this respect, it is striking that Fraser and Nicholson aim to develop their
"postmodernist feminism" as a perspective, which combines the strengths of the two
"currents," while ruling out their supposed weakness--thus framing, borrowing a term
from Linda Singer, a "lock-step symmetry" (471). Besides oversimplifying the whole
picture, a "symmetry" such as this does violence to various aspects at stake in both
"currents"--even in Lyotardian thought per se--by simply precluding them. A mere
resemblance in targeting the discourses of traditional Western "philosophy" as weIl as
traditional hegemonic authorities and partially in regard to their origins in the
(counter)cultural practices ofthe 1960s speaks more in favor of a "cross-fertilization,"
,thematic interplay, and strategic engagement between the two "currents" than a
perspective, integrating the two by following a "paradigmatic protocol of linkage" (465,
475). Furthermore, the notion of an "alliance" working more in support of the latter
seems to be too vague to bear any illuminating insight into the "encounter" in question.
As discourses of resistance, evoking difference and being permanently reworked and
revised, feminisms and postmodernisms cannot be rethought as clear-cut dogmatic forms
serving as the necessary basis for a formallinkage.
In their attempts at outlining a "postmodernist feminism," Fraser and Nicholson
resist merely applying ready-made concepts of Lyotardian thinking considered fruitful to
their feminist project--vaguely defended as such by an emphasis on "liberatory politics"
for women, encompassing a drive for "emancipatory alternatives." Since Lyotardian
thought cannot be referred to as overall "feminist" per definitionem--only in his better-
known piece on "women's struggle" does he ponder over the subordination of women,
assuming, however, the position of a phallocratic philosopher he attempts to criticize in
the first place by showing "women" "one of the things at stake" in their struggle and not
concerning hirnself with conceptualizing change--it is rethought, for the most part
dismissed, but partially appropriated according to the specific ends and needs of the
project. The Fraserian and Nicp.olsonian approaches entail, for example, a rethought
version of the Lyotardian coinage of "metanarrative" in form of the conceptual tool of
"quasi-metanarratives." By rewriting this tune of androcentric thought, the two feminist
theorists still place themselves in the problematic feminist tradition of transforming
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androcentric frameworks as practiced with the multitude of Marxisms, leaving feminisms
with "no-win dilemmas" due to androcentric notions not completely mIed out (Harding
649). In other respects, however, their theorizations go beyond a rewriting such as this,
evoking a fallibilistic as well as pragmatic approach and embracing the instability of
categories and concepts as a chance and not an impasse of feminist theorizing.
Focusing on the means to criticize other feminisms offered by the "anti-
foundationalism" of the Fraserian and Nicholsonian "postmodernist feminism," I would
argue that a rethought line of Lyotardian thought and criticism of "philosophy" appears
nevertheless to be fmitful. The use of supposed universal and cross-culturally valid
claims about social conditions, notions of subjectivity, and norms can be dismantled and
shown in their concealing of difference. At the same time, the Nicholsonian and Fraserian
rejection of a rereading of Lyotardian thought as claiming the "end" of "metanarratives"
of the Enlightenment, for example, has to be supported not only with respect to the
foreclosing of forms of social criticism needed by feminist theorizations, but also in
regard to incoherencies and contradictions not elaborated on by the two feminist
theorists. As Ernesto Laclau convincingly points out, the very conceptualization of an
"end" as realized in Lyotardian thought merely reproduces the modernist "logic of
foundations" criticized by the latter (329). Even if Lyotard would repudiate the latter's
labeling as "modernist" due to bis close linkage of the "modem" and "postmodern" in
articles following his Postmodern Condition, the claiming or stating of an "end" is not
theoretically sound given the maxims ofbis approaches, since he ends.up being caught in
what resembles the establishment of a "metanarrative" of bis own. However, problems
predominantly concerning the question of adequacy for a feminist project remain with the
Nicholsonian and Fraserian alternative as will be shown below.
In his later writings, however, Lyotard also goes beyond the concept of an "end"
himseIt: stressing a notion of "sbifting," while dismissing the one of a monolithic "state,"
and places his thinking more explicitly in the realm of "modernity." Nevertheless, his
main emphasis on the incommensurability of heteromorphous language games and--in his
later work The Differend, the heterogeneity of "phrases"--which are not to be
subordinated to the ends of a consensus going along with a broader ethical stance such
as the project of an "emancipation of women" remains unaltered. Arguing from a
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position based on critical theory and displaying aspects of the "Habermas-Lyotard-
debate," the feminist philosopher Seyla Benhabib criticizes the French philosopher for his
conceptualization of the "agonistics" of language and the paralogistic approach to
legitimation, since they either lead to a "polytheism of values" or to a privileging of "one
domain of discourse and knowledge" over other domains, contradicting the Lyotardian
striving for difference and against universal norms (Rejoinder 113). In both cases--either
relativist or inconsistent--a distinction between performativity and emancipation is seen
as not possible. Furthermore, the Lyotardian approach does not differentiate between
making a validity claim--which would, following Lyotard, only be possible in a local and
context-specific way in the first place--and "forcing" someone to believe in the validity of
some particular claim (114).
Concerning Benhabib's first charge, who is not willing to give up a "minimal
criteria of validity" for political and theoretical practices, the Lyotardian radical anti-
totalitarian perspective in fact rejects any notion of a "foundationalist" grounding. It
acknowledges, however, the danger .of currents gaining influence which are to be termed
non-democratic or discriminatory against women according to criteria advanced by the
kind of emancipatory stance favored by Benhabib. The principal means to counter moves
~f currents such as these are the Lyotardian political project of testifying to "difference."
The charge of relativism, therefore, is not fully convincing. A direction following some
normative grounding cannot be given, in fact is regarded as a use of "force" in itself: but
the approach still proves to be capable of counteracting totalizing tendencies, partially
matching those referred to as anti-feminist.
In regard to the second charge, Lyotardian thought does not ignore the problem of
power and force. The language games are, for example, understood as being threatened
in their incommensurabiltiy and heterogeneity by the performance criterion in
contemporary society. However, Lyotard's perspective--even ifit enhances a conception
of "resistance"--is incapable of going all the way in a complex analysis of coercion and
power, leaving out various dimensions to be analyzed and the problematic unsettled.
In developing their project of a "postmodernist feminism," Nicholson and Fraser
do not follow Lyotard all the way in his conceptualization of incommensurable and
heteromorphous language games and rejection of any normative notion and "theoretical"
endeavor. Their advancing of "Iarger narratives" of social criticism, still not assuming a
"foundationalist" grounding due to the counteracting tendencies of smaller narratives
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also deployed and their overall fallibilistic and paradigmatic approach, answers the need
for an "adequate" analysis of the realms of the economy and state institutions and sheds
light on the question ofjustice not sufficiently tackled in Lyotardian thought.
Concerns about the Nicholsonian and Fraserian version of a "social criticism
without philosophy," however, have to be raised in regard to the feminist commitment to
"emancipation" and "radical social change." Benhabib, for example, perceives any "social
criticism without philosophy" as not "possible" (Uneasy Alliance 143). Instead of
debunking any notion of "foundationalism," which would render the "emancipatory
interest" of women "inconceivable," political engagement incoherent, and abandon a
utopian projection, she insists on a grounding of feminist social criticism in a
"foundationalist philosophy" committed to critical self-reflection (143, 147). "Situated
social criticism" as advanced by Fraser and ~icholson has to make use of "immanent"
criteria of legitimation which are, however, notavailable in a coherent and non-
conflictual set in a given culture and thus need to be construed according to some
normative principles (146). As Fraser herself points out, Benhabib does approach the
Fraserian and Nicholsonian project by construing a "false antithesis" (Antithesis, 170). A
commitment to "anti-foundationalism" neither precludes social criticism nor political
practice. The "postmodernist feminism" advanced here does not exclude larger narratives
which make normative claims, for example, about justice. "Situated criticisnl" itself: and
thereby deploying another version thereof than Benhabib, does not reject an appeal to a
normative perspective, but perceives the latter as "situated." It is in need--and so is any
critical self-reflection on it--to be located and analyzed in its specific historical, social,
and cultural context.
What remains problematic, however, is the question of the distinction between
what can and cannot be regarded as "adequate" and useful for the "postmodern-feminist"
approach in question. With no "rules" given, the boundary has to be a floating one.
Considering the rereading of Lyotardian thought as "anti-foundationalist," allowing the
development of categories such as the one of "quasi-metanarrative," the problematic
concerned also sterns from the Lyotardian oeuvre per se, demonstrating the possible
fallacies of an appropriation of androcentric thought. Nevertheless, the impossibility to
clearly discriminate methods and categories working to anti-feminist ends from those
working to feminist ones, does not have to be seen as an impasse of the entire project.
An embracing of instability, e.g. of categories and concept, as the result of the
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paradigmatic and fallibilistic approach can also be read as a chance to avoid the mere
appropriation and rethinking of androcentric thought and the totalizing aspect of feminist
theorizing.
Reconsidering finally the question of the subject and category of feminist
discourses and theorizations, "woman" or "women," it may be fruitful to start by
focusing on Rosalind Delmar's dictum of "women" as "feminism[s'] greatest problem"
(21). It indicates the insufficiency of the category "woman" to grasp the multitude of
meanings and contents contemporarily ascribed to it, rendering it too incoherent to serve
as a unified and unifying category and thus raising far-reaching questions of its
applicability in feminist theorizations. Lyotardian thought with its move away from the
universal subject, stressing the transitory nature of the self in the light of their being
positioned by the effects of language games, can inform a reconceptualization of
feminisms' most cmcial category to the extent that "women" as the "hidden companion"
of "universal man" is dissolved. Fraser and Nicholson' s "postmodernist feminism"
reflects this implication of Lyotardian thought by attempting to conceptualize categories
of "woman" and "feminine gender identity" as plural and complex and neither universally
nor "foundationally" grounded.
Most explicitly developed in his conceptualization of "phrases," orienting the "I"
and their being "in dispute" with one another, expressing the determination of the "self'
by antagonisms, Lyotardian thought, however, does reject key features of feminist
theorizations, most of all the conceptualization of a subjectivity which distinguishes
between "woman" and "man." The very lack thereof neither allows for analyzing
differences between the two as well as elements of discrimination nor for thinking
through the subject "woman" as endowed with critical capacities. Therefore, the
Nicholsonian and Fraserian debunking ofthese aspects ofLyotard's approaches becomes
a necessary requirement for the safeguarding of central features of feminisms, preventing
their "postmodernist feminism" from sliding into a "postfeminism." They are able to
show that pragmatic theories of discourse, which partially overlap with the contexts of
Lyotard's own work, can still inform feminist thinking, letting it accept a critique of
"foundatiol1alism" without giving up core categories.
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Lyotardian thought, nevertheless, still offers possibilities to inform "postmodern-
feminist" theorizations. Instead of proceeding in the direction of a "great beyond"
concerning the "difference between sexes" as advocated in Lyotard's One of the Things
at Stake in Women's Struggles, it may be more fruitful to focus on the Lyotardian
concept of the "differend." Being one of the paradoxes of many feminisms, the difference
between the sexes is both embraced--to formulate political claims towards the male-
centered heterosexist hegemonic regime and to form identities, allowing at least so~e
sort of feminist alliances--and attacked--as the basis of the discrimination and exclusion
of women. Thinking through it, borrowing from an impulse by Bill Readings, as
imposing a "differend" (xxvi), it becomes possible to testify to the difference between the
sexes, while conceptualizing it not as something "true," unchangeable, and monolithic,
but constructed and marked by dispute and force. An approach such as this does not
seek·to overcome difference, but to be able to acknowledge it and the "inlpossibility and
necessity of exchange" around a "differend" "over which no agreement can be reached."
By doing so, it becomes possible to open up alternative approaches to reconceptualize
difference which leave the heterosexist matrix to be freed in a multiplicity of alternative
imaginaries.
The Nicholsonian and Fraserian approach of ruling out universally and
"foundationally" grounded conceptualizations of the categories "woman" and "feminine
gender identity" by "genealogizing" them and opening them to a plurality and complexity
achieved by their fallibilistic and paradigmatic theorizing does avoid fallacies of other
feminist currents, but does little to analyze the "foundational" notion of a unified self and
universal subject, which is still at work at the basis of androcentric theorizing. In this
regard, theoretical approaches advanced by the feminist scholar Iudith Butler prove to be
fruitfuI, shedding new light on the problem area in question. Without rejecting the notion
of the subject, but also not taking it as its very point of departure, Butler interprets it as
produced by a matrix of power and discourse which are part of the specific social
relations in a given culture and society, opening up new perspectives to think about the
problematic ofpower (Foundations 155-7). The constitution ofthe subject takes place by
differential and exclusionary means--an interpretation partially overlapping with the
Lyotardian conceptualization of an "outside" as securing the dominance of a category or
principle--which are concealed by notions of "autonomy." As a consequence, no so-
called unified and universal subject is ever comple~ely constituted, indicating the
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direction for a subversive practice. Butlerian thought, using this analysis to the ends of a
feminist project, aims at relieving the notion of a subject of its "foundationalist" weight
by reconceptualizing its production as not foreclosing future "claims for inclusion," but
as permanently open, contingent, and contested (154).
The Nicholsonian and Fraserian fallibilistic and paradigmatic conceptualization of
the category "woman" which places the latter in its cultural and historical context will
still encounter resistance by parts ofthe constituencies referred to, since "woman"--as an
"identity category"--does not only function in a descriptive, but also in a normative way,
thus also by exclusionary means (159-60). Going a step beyond the Nicholsonian and
Fraserian approach, Butler, also not willing to announce the "death" of the subject
"woman," elevates a conceptualization that designates it as a "site of permanent
openness and resignifiability." Unlike Fraser and Nicholson and more like the Lyotardian
claim toactivate and testify to difference, Butler wants to preclude any set ofnorms from
pinning down what is an "adequate" "resignification" of the "woman" and what is not.
Only an unconstrained use ofthe category is capable of expressing, following Butler, the
"radical democratic impetus of feminist politics"(161).
To conceptualize an instability of categories, including the one of "woman," as part
of feminist projects can work against androcentric notions still inherent in rethought
frameworks of Western philosophy, including Marxist and deconstructionist currents.
However, areleasing of "woman" "into a future of multiple significations" as advocated
in the Butlerian approach cannot--in fact explicitly rejects to--foreclose the possibility of
its being carried out to non-feminist ends (161), which is still an issue in the Fraserian-
Nicholsonian approach. Furthermore, a move such as this also bears, as Fraser rightfully
points out, some normative notion by giving the very process of "resignification" a
positive charge and privileging some theories of subjectivity over others (Antitllesis 172-
3), putting her strong anti-normative stance in question. Given these objections, it seems
to be fruitful to attempt to integrate Butlerian thought in the theorizations of Fraser and
Nicholson, finding a way to account on normative notions which--accepted by Butler
(Lesen 13 1)--cannot be avoided at least in regard to the necessary formulation of
political aims, while avoiding exclusion.
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Focusing on a perspective for a feminist project that makes use of the intersections
between feminist theorizations and political practices on the one hand and Lyotardian
"postmodernist" thinking on the other reveals a wide variety of prospectives ranging
from fruitful approaches to crucial impasses. What is not at stake is some sort of a "lock-
step symmetry" between feminisms and postmodernisms--not even with Lyotardian
thought alone--due to the radical fluidity and changing nature of the currents in question
which can be seen as discourses of resistance. What appears fruitful is the perspective of
a "cross-fertilization" and "strategic engagement," embracing a critical and partial
informing offeminist projects by Lyotardian thought--and vice versa.
The Fraserian and Nicholsonian project of a "postmodernist fenlinism" is based on
some questionable premises, among others, a misconstrued equation of Lyotardian
thought and postmodernisms as well as an appeal to a--however paradigmatic--"protocol
of linkage" between the two currents in question. Nevertheless, their approaches have
much to offer in further attempts to approach "encounters" betweel1 feminisms and
postmodernisms.
Hardly to be underestimated, the "anti-foundationalism" of Lyotardian thought
informs feminist theorizations, working in the direction of the latter' s weariness towards
philosophy and "foundational" groundings of categories, concepts, and methods of social
theory and criticism. The Fraserian and Nicholsonian theorization of "social criticism
without philosophy," advancing instead a fallibilistic and paradigmatic approach, retains
both local and immanent small narratives as well as larger narratives, enhancing some
normative perspective of "situated criticism" which is constantly subject of being
rethought. By doing so, they reject the universe of phrases or--at an earlier point in his
work--Ianguage games and their heterogeneity and incommensurability in Lyotardian
thought, which remains problematic as far as its shortcomings for a political practice and
an analysis of power are concerned. Nevertheless, Lyotardian thinking can fruitfully
inform feminist projects in ways missed by Fraser and Nicholson, among others, In
regard to the former' s conceptualization of"resistance" and the "differend."
Approaches to and implications for the core category and subject of feminisms,
"woman," reveal further problems of Lyotardian "postmodern" thinking for feminist
theorizations. The former can fruitfully inform a move away from the notion of the
universal and unified subject "woman" as hidden companion of universal "man." Y et, the
dispersal of the subject in the universe of phrases appears to be insufficient for an
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analysis which aims at tackling discrimination on the basis of gender and advancing
feminist political perspectives. The Fraserian and Nicholsonian conceptualization
informed by an overall "anti-foundationalist" approach embraces a rethinking of the
category in question without dismissing it. Their "genealogizing" and placing of
"woman" in specific cultural, social, and historical settings appears to be a fruitful step in
the direction of pursuing solutions to a crucial problematic of the contemporary feminist
movements. Their approach, however, still bears exclusionary means, leading to other
conflicts and blocking a further fruitful openness and instability of the term which could
be secured by rethinking the Butlerian conceptualization of a "site of permanent
openness and resignifiability."
The paper poses far more questions and problems than it attenlpts to discuss and
answer. Having tried to problematize the very notions of "feminism" and
"postmodernism," I also perceive it·as necessary to do so with the term "philosophy," the
multi-Iayered traditions of the discipline referred to by it and its conceptual frameworks
as well as different deployments. It does not seem unlikely that the traditions in question
have more to offer than what is labeled and attacked as "foundationalism." In regard to
the Lyotardian oeuvre which is itself changing and fluid it might be fruitful to consider
the announced--yet still unpublished--sequel to his work The Differend (Bayard 302)
dealing with the "body" and "language" for its potential to shed new light on the
Lyotardian conceptualization of subjectivity. Finally, two core problem areas need to be
discussed (further), both informing key questions and problematics dealt with in this
paper, i. e. the one ofjustice and the one ofpower.
Despite its problems and inconsistencies, Lyotardian thought does have something
to offer feminist theorizations. At stake, however, is not a·"new" marriage oftwo major
intellectual and academic "currents," but a careful and critical cross-fertilization and -
informing which promises to be fruitful in dealing with contemporary problems of the
many feminisms currently at work to realize radical change.
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